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Abstract—The recent advances in micro-sensor hardware tech-
nologies, along with the invention of energy-efﬁcient protocols,
have enabled a world-wide spread in wireless sensor networks
deployment. These networks are used for a large number of
purposes, while having small maintenance and deployment costs.
However, as these are usually unattended networks, several
security threats have emerged. In this work, we show how an
adversary can overhear the encrypted wireless transmissions,
and detect the periodic components of the wireless trafﬁc that
can further reveal the application used in the sensor network.
Trafﬁc analysis is performed in a very energy-efﬁcient way using
the compressed sensing principles. Furthermore, the periodic
components are detected using the Lomb-Scargle periodogram
technique.
Index Terms—compressed sensing, malicious trafﬁc analysis,
signal processing, energy-efﬁciency, wireless sensor networks,
Lomb-Scargle periodogram, Contiki
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent advances in micro-electro-mechanical systems
and low power and highly integrated digital electronics, have
enabled the development of low-cost micro-sensors. These
devices are used for measuring a number of physical attributes
such as temperature, light, humidity, barometric pressure,
acceleration, velocity, acoustics, magnetic ﬁeld, etc [1]. The
sensors are not used in isolation but are grouped into the
so-called motes. Motes are integrated devices (e.g. [2]) that
contain CPU and memory functionalities under a common
board. The advances in sensor operating systems (e.g. Contiki,
TinyOS) along with the standardization of new protocols (e.g
IEEE 802.15.4, Zigbee) and the adoption of already existing
networking protocols (IPv4/IPv6), have made feasible the
deployment of wireless sensor networks (WSNs).
Nowadays, WSNs are used for a large number of purposes
such as for environmental monitoring [3], critical infrastruc-
ture protection [4], emergency response and disaster relief [5],
life-logging [6], health monitoring [7], surveillance [8], water-
use efﬁciency [9], earthquake localization [10], structural
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damage detection [11], etc. Their main advantage is that they
are easily deployed in large and harsh areas. Information is
sensed and collected by (often) battery-operated motes, and
transmitted through a multi-hop routing scheme to a central
server, known as sink, for further processing. The sink is
a node with enhanced hardware capabilities that performs
the more complex tasks required, as motes themselves are
severe-constrained devices in terms of processing, storage,
computation, and power.
As WSNs become worldwide, their security issues have
become a major concern. WSNs face a number of security
threats at different layers such as: (i) jamming (interference)
attacks at the physical layer, (ii) guaranteed time slot attacks at
the medium access layer, (iii) sinkhole, wormhole and other
routing attacks at the network layer. A number of counter-
measures have been introduced for thwarting these attacks,
mainly focusing on intrusion detection, and cryptographic
schemes [12].
Except the aforementioned attacks that are successfully
detected and mitigated using intrusion detection schemes,
another type of attack, the malicious trafﬁc analysis attack,
cannot be detected and easily mitigated. In this attack, an
adversary has the role of a passive listener that collects
information from the network, and tries to detect and identify
different periodic components in the captured network trafﬁc.
Essentially, the ultimate scope of the adversary is to detect
information such as the type of applications that execute in
the WSN, the paths related to the routing algorithm, etc. Such
an information disclosure can severely violate the privacy and
security of information-sensitive applications, like those used
in wireless body area sensor networks [13]. In this work, we
show how an adversary by using advanced signal processing
techniques, can effectively detect the periodic components in
the network trafﬁc, in a very energy-efﬁcient way. Trafﬁc
analysis is performed using the Lomb-Scargle periodogram
(LSP) technique, while power consumption reduces through
the use of the compressed sensing (CS) principles.
Related work focuses on the study of trafﬁc analysis that
reveals periodic patterns of the captured trafﬁc. As the au-
thors in [14] show, signal processing techniques can be very
effective in trafﬁc analysis. We complement this work by con-
sidering an adversary that by using CS, signiﬁcantly reduces
the power consumption required for trafﬁc analysis. Other
contributions like [13], [15], [16], propose countermeasures
against malicious trafﬁc analysis. On the contrary, we work on
the attacker side and show how it can perform energy-efﬁcient
malicious trafﬁc analysis.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section II
describes signal processing techniques used for trafﬁc analysis.
In Section III we give the background on CS theory. Sec-
tion IV presents the adversary model, while the performance
evaluation is shown in Section V. Finally, conclusions appear
in Section VI.
II. TRAFFIC ANALYSIS USING SIGNAL PROCESSING
TECHNIQUES
Very often in communication networks, when information
has to be protected by eavesdroppers, security primitives
like encryption, authentication, and data integrity are used.
A second level of protection usually follows with intrusion
detection schemes. This is more imperative in WSNs, due
to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. However,
regardless the strength of the security algorithm, and the
effectiveness of the intrusion detection system, an adversary
can still overhear the wireless channel and identify different
periodic components by observing the encrypted trafﬁc. These
observations will allow him later to infer regarding the appli-
cations used or the routing algorithm decisions taken.
The key idea for identifying periodic components in an
encrypted trafﬁc is to convert packet traces into signals, and
then process these signals using appropriate signal processing
techniques [14]. This will allow the identiﬁcation of prominent
recurring frequencies and time-periods. A common spectral
processing technique used for periodic component identiﬁca-
tion is the standard Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). DFT
computes the spectral power densities and requires the encoded
signal to be uniformly sampled. Supposing there is a uniformly
sampled signal x(n) with N samples, DFT gives a N-point
discrete spectrum XN (k):
XN (k) =
N−1∑
n=0
x(n) ∗ e−j2πkn/N = DFT [x(n)] (1)
XN (k) can be computed using the Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT), and the resulted peaks in the spectrum correspond
to the periodic components in the observed trafﬁc. However,
the resulted spectrum can contain many harmonically related
peaks and furthermore, it does not provide a good unbiased
estimate in the presence of noise [13]. Another technique
available, the Welch Averaged Periodogram [17] (WAP) can
give more reliable results, as periodograms’ main characteris-
tic is that they can perform well in the presence of noise or
interference [14]. WAP utilizes averaging in order to reduce
noise inﬂuence and is generated by averaging the K separate
spectra X(r)N , computes over K different segments of data,
each of length L (≤ N )
Px(k) =
1
KU
K−1∑
r=0
|X(r)L (k)|2 (2)
where X(r)L (k) = DFT [w(n)xr(n)] and U =
1
L
∑L−1
n=0 w
2(n), where the windowed data xr(n) is the
rth windowed segment of x(n), w(n) is a windowing
function that reduces the artifacts caused by the abrupt
changes at the end-points of the window, and U is the
normalized window power. The peaks given by Px are real
values that correspond to frequencies of event times of arrival.
As mentioned before, WAP can be efﬁciently used for
the detection of periodic events in the presence of noise or
interference. The authors in [13] use WAP for the detection
of periodic events in a simulated single-hop wireless body
area sensor network using the packet time arrivals. However,
as packet arrivals in communication networks are inherently
unevenly spaced, they result in a signal encoding that is also
unevenly spaced. The FFT and WAP methods perform well
only when the packet arrivals are evenly spaced. In order to
overcome this limitation and perform efﬁcient trafﬁc analysis,
a method called as the Lomb-Scargle periodogram (LSP) can
be used. LSP is a spectral analysis technique designed for
data that are unevenly spaced. Compared to the WAP and FFT
techniques, although LSP requires more computational power,
it has the added advantage that the input data are sparse, hence
they consume less memory [14].
The LSP technique estimates a power spectrum of N points
of data for arbitrary angular frequencies. The power density
for an angular frequency ω is given by:
PN (ω) =
1
2σ2
{ [
∑
n(hn − h¯) cosω(tn − τ)]2∑
n cos
2 ω(tn − τ) +
[
∑
n(hn − h¯) sinω(tn − τ)]2∑
n sin
2 ω(tn − τ)
} (3)
where
h¯ =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
hn
σ =
1
N − 1
N−1∑
n=0
(hn − h¯)
τ =
1
2ω
tan−1(
∑
n sin 2ωtn∑
n cos 2ωtn
)
The samples hn, n ∈ [0, N − 1], are the N unevenly spaced
samples of the observed signal at times tn.
In Section IV we show how the LSP technique is used to
reveal the packet ﬂows traversing a simulated WSN. As we are
primarily concerned with energy-efﬁcient trafﬁc analysis, the
LSP method is used jointly with CS for reducing the number of
data required to detect the network ﬂows. In the next section,
we describe the background on CS theory.
III. COMPRESSED SENSING BACKGROUND
The recently proposed theory of compressed sensing (CS)
([18]) uniﬁes compression and encryption in order to minimize
the overhead for data acquisition and sampling in a WSN. CS
exploits the signal structure in order to enable a signiﬁcant
reduction in the sampling and computation costs at a central
unit. The key principles in the development of CS theory are
sparsity and incoherence. A signal x ∈ RN is called sparse
if most of its elements are zero in a speciﬁc transformation
basis. Incoherence satisﬁes the fact that the sampling/sensing
waveforms have an extremely dense representation in the
basis. Assuming signal x ∈ RN is sparse in a basis Ψ, it
can be written as x = Ψb, where b ∈ RN is a sparse vector
with S non-zero components (‖b‖0 = S). CS theory proves
that an S-sparse signal x can be reconstructed exactly with
high probability from M randomized linear projections of the
signal x into a measurement matrix Φ ∈ RM×N . The general
measurement model is expressed as follows:
y = Φx = ΦΨb = Θb (4)
where Θ = ΨΦ.
The original vector b and consequently the sparse signal
x, is estimated by solving the following 0-norm constrained
optimization problem:
bˆ = argmin ‖b‖0 s.t. y = Θb (5)
where the ‖b‖0 norm counts the number of non-zero com-
ponents of b. Note that the formulation of the optimization
problem in (5) uses an l0 norm that measures signal sparsity
instead than the traditionally used in signal processing ap-
plications l2 norm, which measures signal energy. However,
solving (5) is both numerically unstable and NP-complete. For
this reason, the 0 norm can be replaced by the 1 norm and
problem (5) can be rephrased as the following 1 norm convex
relaxation problem:
bˆ = argmin ‖b‖1 s.t. y = Θb. (6)
The 1 norm (‖b‖1 :=
∑
i |bi|) can exactly recover the
S-sparse signal with high probability using only M ≥
CS log(N/S) measurements (C ∈ R+) [18]. Finally, the
reconstructed signal is given by xˆ = Ψbˆ. A variety of re-
construction algorithms based on linear programming, convex
relaxation, and greedy strategies have been proposed to solve
(6). Among them, greedy strategies such as the Orthogonal
Matching Pursuit (OMP) [19] are computationally efﬁcient
Malicious 
Server Sink
Mote-1
Mote-2
Malicious 
Client
Malicious 
Control Channel
Figure 1: Wireless sensor network topology
when the signal of interest is highly sparse.
IV. ADVERSARY MODEL
The adversary model we consider in this work consists of
two distinct entities: (i) the malicious client (MC), and (ii) the
malicious server (MS).
MC is a mote with constrained resources (CPU, memory,
power) that is positioned in a strategic location within a
WSN. Its mission is to observe the wireless trafﬁc and record
the timestamps of the captured packets. For this to become
feasible, its network interface card is set to promiscuous
mode. MC periodically encodes a signal derived from the
packet timestamps and compress it, before transmitting it
to a more advanced, in terms of resources node (malicious
server), for further processing. Figure 1 shows a simulation
testbed with two legitimate motes, a single legitimate sink,
and the adversary entities (the dotted circles symbolize the
transmission ranges of the motes and the MC). MC and MS
communicate through a dedicated encrypted malicious control
channel (MCC). As it concerns the legitimate WSN, motes
periodically transmit sensed data to the sink using different
packet transmission rates. Mote-1 transmits with a rate of 10
packets/sec (Flow-1), while Mote-2 transmits with a rate of 17
packets/sec (Flow-2). Therefore, the transmission frequencies
of Flow-1 and Flow-2 are 0.1 and 0.059, respectively. The two
legitimate motes, the sink, and the MC use ContikiOS [20],
an open source operating system for WSNs. The testbed is
simulated using Cooja, Contiki’s simulator/emulator, while the
trafﬁc from the motes towards the sink is encrypted using
IPsec [21].
The scope of this paper is to show that MC, jointly with MS
can perform energy-efﬁcient malicious trafﬁc analysis. MC
records data from the captured trafﬁc that are transmitted to the
MS for further processing. As shown later, MS uses the LSP
technique (Eq. 3) in order to detect the periodic components
of the captured trafﬁc. The malicious trafﬁc analysis is ﬁrst
initiated by MC performing several tasks. First, it overhears
the wireless channel, recording the timestamps of the captured
packets. Then, it encodes the recorded timestamps into a signal
that is suitable for spectrum analysis by the MS using the
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Figure 2: Encoded signal derived from the timestamps of the
observed trafﬁc
LSP technique. For this speciﬁc case, where two motes are
available, we encode the recorded timestamps by assigning an
amplitude of +1 for the packets belonging to Mote-1, and -
1 for the Mote-2 packets. Figure 2 shows an example of an
encoded signal produced by MC for a 140 seconds packet
trace.
After signal encoding takes place, MC compresses the en-
coded signal using the CS principles in order to minimize the
communication cost with the MS. As MC is a severe resource
constrained device, saving energy is of paramount importance.
It is well known that most of the energy consumption in WSNs
is mainly due to the transmission and listening operations
performed by the motes. In this paper, we minimize the energy
spending due to the transmission operations between the MC
and the MS, by compressing the encoded signals in MC using
CS. Later on, MS decompresses the signal and feeds the LSP
algorithm. As mentioned in Section III, in order to compress
a signal x ∈ RN , it has to be sparse in some basis Ψ, and
it should be written as x = Ψb. Unfortunately, although the
encoded signal is sparse in the basis Ψ = LSP , it cannot be
expressed as a linear function by using LSP as the orthonormal
basis Ψ. For this reason, we follow a different strategy, by
compressing the encoded signal at MC by using the FFT
transform as the Ψ basis. We have veriﬁed that the encoded
signal is also sparse in the frequency domain using FFT. When
the MS receives the compressed signal, it decompresses it
and feeds the LSP algorithm. Signal compression at the MC
involves the use of a transformation matrix Φ ∈ RM×N .
Hence, if x is the original (uncompressed) encoded signal,
MC compress it using Eq. 4, obtaining y, the compressed
version of x.
At this point, we have to choose the appropriate mea-
surement matrix. Recent work has shown that when con-
sidering measurement matrices built using values selected
independently from certain distributions, exact signal recovery
can be achieved with high probability. One such choice is
the Gaussian distribution used in several works (e.g. [22]).
However, the generation of a Gaussian distribution may not
be easily achieved in practical implementations, such in this
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Figure 3: Malicious trafﬁc analysis scheme
work. The authors in [23] show that Toeplitz matrices with
entries drawn from the same distributions (e.g. Gaussian)
are also sufﬁcient to recover a signal with high probability.
A Toeplitz matrix has several attracting features [23]: (i)
it requires the generation of O(N) random variables, while
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) matrices require
the generation of O(MN) variables, (ii) multiplication with
a Toeplitz matrix can be performed using FFT and requires
only O(Nlog2(N)) operations, compared to i.i.d. matrices that
require O(MN) operations, and (iii) i.i.d. matrices are not
easily applicable in certain scenarios (e.g., linear-time invariant
systems). Considering these features, we select Toeplitz as the
measurement matrix.
After MC has compressed the encoded signal using the
Toeplitz matrix, it transmits it over the MCC using a suitable
protocol over UDP. Figure 3 shows the malicious trafﬁc
analysis operations.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we show the performance evaluation of the
malicious trafﬁc analysis attacks in terms of power consump-
tion, and reconstruction error.
A. Reconstruction error and spectrum graph ﬁdelity
As mentioned in the previous section, MC compresses the
signal prior to transmission to the MS. The compression
ratio used directly affects the power consumption and the
reconstruction error, deﬁned as e = ||x−xˆ||2||x||2 , where x and xˆ are
the original and reconstructed signals, respectively. The higher
the compression ratio, the lower the power consumption, and
the higher the reconstruction error. In order to show the
effect of the compression ratio on the reconstruction error,
we vary the compression ratio from 5% to 75%, performing
CS compression at the MC, and decompression at the MS. We
execute simulations for a total of 3 hours in Cooja. Regarding
the CS parameters, we choose the Toeplitz as the measurement
matrix, FFT as the transformation matrix, and set N = 200
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Figure 5: Trafﬁc analysis using the Lomb-Scargle periodogram
the maximum block size of the encoded signal when applying
CS. Figure 4 shows the cumulative density function (CDF)
of the reconstruction error for the various compression ratios.
Essentially, the reconstruction error depicts the ﬁdelity of the
reconstructed signal.
Depending on the application, the reconstruction error
shown in Figure 4 could be characterized as low, medium,
or high for the different compression ratios. In this work, we
are primarily interested to decompress the encoded signal, and
then use the LSP algorithm in order to ﬁnd the highest peaks
in the frequency domain that signal the basic frequencies of
the periodic components in the captured wireless trafﬁc.
Figure 5 shows the spectrum analysis using LSP for an
encoded signal that was transmitted from the MC without
using CS. The spectrum peaks at the frequencies 0.1 and 0.059
correspond to Flow-1 and Flow-2, respectively. The rest of
the peaks correspond to the harmonic frequencies of the ﬂows
that can be eliminated by using the appropriate ﬁltering. In
Figure 6, we show the trafﬁc analysis revealed by the LSP
method when CS is used, and for the different compression
rations (that appear on the left side of each graph). For the
compression ratios of 5%, 25%, and 50%, the two spectrum
peaks clearly reveal the two periodic ﬂows of the WSN. When
the compression gets higher (75%), the ﬁdelity of the spectrum
graph lowers. This is because, as shown in Figure 4, the
reconstruction error signiﬁcantly increases.
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jointly with Compressed Sensing for different compression
ratios
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Figure 7: Power consumption of the Malicious Client for the
various compression ratios
B. Power consumption
MC periodically encodes the captured timestamps and sends
the encoded signals to MS for trafﬁc analysis. As already
mentioned in the literature, the power consumption related
to packet transmissions is the second highest after that due
to the listening operations. We apply CS for compressing the
packets MC sends to MS, and so we minimize the power that is
consumed for the transmission operations. For measuring the
power consumption of the MC, for the different compression
ratios applied during CS, we use powertrace [24], a built-in
power measurement module of Contiki. We simulated a 3-hour
run using the topology shown in Figure 1, recording the total
power consumption in MC. We repeat this procedure for 50
times, and plot MC’s power consumption in Figure 7, where
the error bars show the 95% conﬁdence intervals. Observe that
as the compression ratio increases, MC’s power consumption
signiﬁcantly decreases. This is because less packets are trans-
mitted into the network, hence less power is consumed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we presented an adversary model that per-
forms malicious trafﬁc analysis in a WSN. It consists of two
distinct entities: a malicious client, and a malicious server.
The malicious client overhears the wireless channel, recording
the timestamps of the captured packets. The timestamps are
then encoded into signals that are compressed according to the
compressed sensing principles. The performance evaluation
shows that the power consumption signiﬁcantly reduces as
the compression ratio increases. Furthermore, the ﬁdelity of
the spectrum graph produced in the malicious server using
the LSP method is high, and it successfully reveals the
periodic components of the captured wireless trafﬁc for high
compression ratios.
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